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It is not unusual for a reader of a novel, especially that of the nineteenth century variety, to assume that, in 
reading, she is acquiring important insights into human beings. Yet philosophers have often found this 
assumption problematic. Most agree that fiction can be a source of psychological understanding, either 
explicitly, via psychological descriptions of characters, or implicitly, via the construction of psychological 
character portraits. However, there is disagreement about the importance of fiction’s potential 
contribution in this area. 
 Some have suggested that the psychological information presented in a work of fiction could not 
reasonably strike a reader as true without the reader having come across it already in some other non-
fictional context. Jerome Stolnitz represents this view when he writes: “Art, uniquely, never confirms its 
truths. If [on reading Jane Austen] we find that stubborn pride and ignorant prejudice sometimes keep 
attractive men and women apart, we find the evidence for this truth about the great world in the great 
world” (1992: 198; see also Diffey 1995: 210). Meanwhile, Noël Carroll suggests that, in the moral realm, 
which presumably includes the realm of moral psychology, “if… learning is a matter of the acquisition of 
interesting propositions heretofore unknown… then… there is no learning when it comes to the vast 
majority of narrative artworks” (1998: 141). In contrast, others have cast fiction as a potentially ‘self-
sufficient’ source of psychological understanding (Robinson 1995; Conolly and Haydar 2001: 119).
 As already intimated in Carroll’s remark, a second prong of the attack has it that the psychological 
information provided by fiction cannot be genuinely interesting; that, at best, it is made up of 
‘truisms’ (see also Stolnitz 1992: 194). Others deny this, emphasizing the importance of the information 
acquired (Graham 1995; Robinson 1995; Conolly and Haydar 2001).
  It seems obvious that fictions can be a ‘self-sufficient’ source of interesting psychological insights, 
and it seems curious that some writers have thought otherwise. One contributory factor here might be a 
certain picture of what it is to acquire psychological understanding, according to which such 
understanding is inductively acquired through extrapolation from evidence. On this view, where p is a 
proposition expressing some piece of psychological information, one comes to recognize p as true by 
encountering, either directly or via testimony, partial evidence for p, with the degree of confirmation for 
p, increasing, at least initially, in proportion to the number of occasions upon which such evidence is 
encountered.
 Such a picture might appear to validate both the thought that a work of fiction cannot be ‘self-
sufficient’ with respect to any psychological information disseminated, and that a fiction can provide 
knowledge only of uninteresting truisms. One who supposed that psychological information was acquired 
inductively, via direct or indirect exposure to relevant evidence, might be tempted to treat a psychological 
portrait or description delineated in a fiction as a kind of testimony – that is, as a form of second-hand 
evidence of the phenomenon picked out. If this were so, then the mere fact of its single appearance in a 
fiction could not be enough, on its own, to show the reader that it picked out a genuine phenomenon ‘in 
real life;’ the reader would have to be exposed to additional appearances before she could assume this 
with any reliability. (Analogously, neither would a single report of cold fusion legitimize the assumption 
that cold fusion was possible.) In fact, assuming that one treats a psychological description expressed in a 
work of fiction as testimony about the phenomenon in question, rather than as some kind of first-hand 
evidence of that phenomenon, additional complications about the reliability of the information presented 
seem to be raised, along the lines of those raised for testimony generally.
 At this point, one might take one of two positions (or, like Stolnitz, take both). Perhaps motivated 
by worries about the reliability of the testimony of authors concerning psychological matters, one might 
deny that a psychological portrait or description in a fictional work could count as any kind of evidence 
for a psychological truth – authors, after all, are not generally trained as psychologists and are all too 
prone to imply contradictory statements (Stolnitz 1992: 196). Or, less counterintuitively, one might 
acknowledge that fiction can be, and often is, a source of psychological understanding for a reader 
(Stolnitz 1992: 193), in which case, at least two things would follow. First, any information presented in a 
work of fiction must be recognized as information, and must be recognized as true based on evidence 
already encountered by the reader prior to reading that work; this entails that works of fiction cannot 
present, on their own, wholly new truths. Second, any information thus presented would tend not to be of 
great complexity or interest, since the more complex and specific a psychological portrait or description 
expressed in a fiction, the less likely one has already found evidence for it elsewhere.
 This view of psychological understanding as a kind of inductively acquired understanding appears 
to implicitly ground several authors’ skepticism about fiction’s potential for meaningful instruction. 
Stolnitz claims: “None of its truths are peculiar to art. All are proper to some extra-artistic sphere of the 
great world” (1992:198). Terry Diffey writes “we cannot learn from a work… unless we already know 
that… the world is as the work shows it to be” (1995: 210). Meanwhile, Carroll’s apparent presupposition 
that psychological understanding must be empirically acquired has been seized upon and criticized by 
certain other commentators (Conolly and Haydar 2001: 121).
 I shall not attack the premises of such writers directly. Rather, I shall reject their conclusions, 
arguing that there are certain psychological depictions which, when presented in a fiction, in virtue of 
their very intelligibility to the reader, reveal their nature as possibilities of human experience, thereby 
bringing the reader to new psychological understanding of a propositional kind. In these cases, the reader 
does not need any prior (or subsequent) evidence of such phenomena in order to see that they are genuine 
possibilities for human life – states of mind actual human beings might have – and so the psychological 
understanding acquired by the reader through exposure to such portraits is not acquired inductively. This 
means that there is restriction neither on the novelty nor on the interest of the information potentially 
acquired in such a manner.
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 First, though, I describe some of the ways in which a fiction may make certain actions of its 
protagonist intelligible. In later sections, I show that these cases potentially provide psychological 
understanding, not just of fictional characters, but of real people as well. 
Fictions and the Intelligibility of Actions
Uncontroversially, a fiction can make an action of a character intelligible. On what one might call a 
‘weak’ or ‘formal’ conception of intelligibility, a fiction makes a given fictional action (or mental state) 
intelligible simply by filling out aspects of the psychology of the fictional agent, showing how the action 
in question coherently relates, in terms of means and ends, to other aspects of her mental set. For instance, 
a fiction might make George’s joining the circus weakly intelligible, by making it clear that he wants to 
become a lion-tamer, and that he believes joining the circus will enable him to do this. Perhaps it also 
reveals that he wants to become a lion-tamer in order to outdo a rival, that he believes becoming a lion-
tamer will enable him to do this, and that he wants to outshine his rival in order to impress his beloved… 
and so on. A minimal requirement upon making a fictional action intelligible in this weak sense is to start 
by describing some goal of the fictional agent, and then to attribute to her a belief that the action in 
question will achieve, or contribute to achieving, the goal. The resulting description of a belief and an 
attitude will constitute the agent’s reason for so acting (Davidson 1980a: 3-4). One might then provide a 
context for this reason, by showing how it fits with further goals she has and with her beliefs about how 
the action will achieve such goals.
 There is an obvious sense in which fictions can do this. For instance, Nabokov’s Lolita makes the 
kidnapping and drugging of a child formally intelligible by showing how those actions cohere with the 
protagonist’s desire to seduce the child, and with his belief that kidnapping and drugging her is a means of 
doing so. Similarly, Toni Morrison’s Beloved makes infanticide weakly intelligible by furnishing an 
account of the surrounding states of mind which might accompany such an act.
 However, simply showing how a given fictional action or mental state coheres with other mental 
states need not on its own say anything very informative. Finding intelligible, in this weak sense, a 
fictional character’s action A, in terms of some prior desire D1 to achieve a certain goal G1 – say, the act 
of procuring a saucer of mud because one desires it (the example is from Anscombe 1963) – might just be 
a matter of attributing to the character another desire D2 for some further goal G2 (say, the desire to rub 
mud into one’s face), and a belief about how satisfaction of D1 is a means of satisfying D2. For each new 
desire so posited, such (weak) intelligibility could be a matter of explaining that desire in terms of yet 
another desire, in much the same way. The positing of such further desires, along with relevant beliefs 
about the relationship between the relevant goals, could go on for some time without A being made 
intelligible to the reader in an interesting sense. To anticipate: it would be of no use merely to be told, for 
instance, that the character procures a saucer of mud with which to rub mud into her face, if one did not 
also understand why she might want to rub mud into her face. Additionally, to be told, say, that she wants 
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to rub mud into her face because she wants her face to be the same color as her wardrobe, would not help 
matters. Something else is needed, and it is not just the positing of some further desires and beliefs per se.
 A distinction therefore should be drawn between weak or formal intelligibility and substantive 
intelligibility. A central way to make a given fictional action substantively intelligible is not simply to cite 
certain mental states which cohere with it, but also to show that the mental states with which it coheres 
are themselves substantively intelligible. I shall clarify this by focusing on two ways in which an author 
might show the mental states of a fictional character (and thereby any actions of hers motivated by such 
states) to be substantively intelligible.
 First, take the case of desire. The citing of a desire is a central way for an author to rationalize a 
certain act of a fictional agent: she did A because she wanted G (and she believed that A was a means of 
obtaining G). But in order for this to work as an interesting rationalization, the desire itself has to be made 
substantively intelligible.
 A central way in which a reader comes to find a fictional character’s desire to achieve a certain goal 
substantively intelligible is via the fiction’s making manifest its relation, ultimately, to a ‘desirability 
characterization’ (Anscombe 1963: 70-2); that is (or so I shall claim), to a goal which the reader judges as 
desirable, ceteris paribus. One understands, in this stronger sense, a character’s desire D for goal G1, if one 
sees that the character wants to achieve G1 in order, ultimately, to achieve Gn, where Gn is a goal one 
judges to be desirable, ceteris paribus.
 Take again, for simplicity’s sake, Anscombe’s unusual case of the desire for a saucer of mud, itself 
made weakly intelligible by its connection to the agent’s desire to rub mud into her face. Both of the 
desires cited here might become substantively intelligible to a reader R upon R’s realizing that the 
character who desires this, does so in order to improve the condition of her skin. Such a realization would 
make the action substantively intelligible to R where R judged that, other things being equal, improving 
the condition of one’s skin is a desirable thing to do. In contrast, to revert to the former example, the 
positing of the further goal to make one’s face the same color as one’s wardrobe would not make 
intelligible to R a character’s wanting a saucer of mud in the same way, since normally R would have to 
struggle to see how such a desire could be connected, immediately or mediately, to any desirable end.
 Fictions, then, can make an apparently unintelligible desire of a character comprehensible, not only 
by furnishing a coherent account of surrounding mental states and behavior, but, more interestingly, by 
showing that the desire falls under, or is grounded in a further desire which falls under, a desirability 
characterization. In Lolita, for instance, Humbert wants to seduce the child Lolita, and believes that 
kidnapping and drugging her is a means to doing so. This desire, perhaps only formally intelligible to 
many when so baldly stated, is made substantively intelligible for the reader when the desire is related, 
either directly or indirectly, through Nabokov’s insidious art, to some desirability characterization: 
perhaps, a desire to regain feelings of one’s sexual awakening; or a desire for sexual possession of a 
person with at least some of Lolita’s physical characteristics (her “glowing” skin, “the silky shimmer of 
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her temples shading into bright, brown, hair” (Nabokov 1995: 41) and other physical characteristics 
associated with beauty and health are constantly emphasized). Making this desire intelligible renders 
Humbert’s subsequent behavior, motivated by this desire, also intelligible. (The fact that Lolita as a whole 
alternately invites and evades such interpretations is consistent with my eventual claim that the work 
makes intelligible certain reasons for acting as Humbert does, whether or not it is true in the fiction that 
these are Humbert’s reasons for so acting). [Comment: Should the word ‘insidious’ be used to describe  
Nabokov’s art? The word means: ‘proceeding in a gradual, subtle way, but with harmful effects.’ 
Do you wish to imply that Nabokov’s work was harmful?]
 Of course, for many mundane cases, there is no need for a fiction to explicitly reveal the 
desirability characterization of a given action, since the reader will readily anticipate that characterization. 
I am concerned, rather, with the sort of fictional action which would, on a condensed characterization, be 
unintelligible to most readers, without the fiction’s (often prolonged and perhaps implicit) articulation of 
the desirability characterization under which the action falls.
 Some clarifications: where a desire is made substantively intelligible to reader R by its ultimate 
relation to a goal which R judges to be desirable, R need not be concerned to pursue this goal herself. This 
is part of the point of the ceteris paribus clause; it indicates the possibility that R might have other goals 
which she deems more valuable than the goal cited in explanation. In this case, the fact that she herself 
does not pursue that goal as an end does not show that she does not value it.
 Secondly, that a desire D of a character becomes substantively intelligible to R by its being related, 
ultimately, to a goal which the character judges to be desirable, is consistent with R’s finding the goals to 
which D is more immediately related positively undesirable, even reprehensible. This is shown by the 
Lolita case, but the point can be made more clearly in relation to a simpler example. Say that a fictional 
character on a train beats up a fellow passenger in order to spread blood all over the carriage (I owe this 
example to Peter Goldie). Perhaps we can find this substantively intelligible if it is related to the further 
goal of making a pleasing pattern, an end which we understand, if not as enormously important, then at 
least as having some value, ceteris paribus. In this sense, we can come to understand the action. But this is 
not to say, of course, that we think it a good thing to spread blood all over the carriage. For, quite 
properly, we also judge that any value the action would accrue, when understood as the act of making a 
pleasing pattern, is outweighed or even negated by other consequences of the action when it is fully 
described. (In another sort of case, one might acknowledge the desirability of a goal towards which an 
action is ultimately aimed, thereby acknowledging the action as substantively intelligible, while judging 
that the action is nonetheless a bad thing, because one judges that it is not in fact likely to achieve the goal 
in question.)
 Acknowledging the former sort of case means that there may yet be a sense in which a 
substantively intelligible desire of a character, in the sense I have described, is nonetheless unintelligible: 
namely, insofar as the reader cannot understand the character’s prioritization of the desire over other 
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considerations, or cannot understand how the value for the character of achieving a given desire is not 
outweighed or negated by other consequences. Though there is not the space to explore the matter here, it 
seems that a fiction may also make a desire, or action motivated by such a desire, intelligible in this richer 
sense. In this paper, however, I shall largely focus on substantive intelligibility in the more limited sense 
just delineated (though I shall briefly return to the richer sense).
 Finally, I claim only that being related to a desirability characterization is a sufficient condition for 
the substantive intelligibility of a desire, not that it is a necessary one. This means my position is 
untroubled by cases where fictional actions, although apparently substantively intelligible from a third-
person perspective, are yet genuinely pursued sub specie mali – such as, perhaps, the activities of Satan in 
Paradise Lost, whose dictum is “Evil, be though my good” (see Anscombe 1963: 75; Velleman 1992:18; 
Dancy 1993: 6). For, if we must accept such cases at face value, it can be allowed that they are 
substantively intelligible in a way different from the cases with which I am concerned. Of course, the 
rejoinder may be that the substantive intelligibility of an action generally has nothing to do with any 
motivating desire being connected to a desirability characterization. I fail to see, however, how such a 
claim could be maintained, both when confronted by the intuitive force of the sorts of literary cases 
already discussed (that is, cases where an otherwise incomprehensible fictional action is made intelligible 
by its perceived connection to recognizable values), and, perhaps more centrally, when confronted by the 
characteristic way in which ordinary people try to make sense of others (real or fictional) by positing 
possible motivations for their acts in terms of goals readily understood as desirable. (For instance: ‘why 
do you think she hit him?’ ‘well, perhaps she wanted to let off steam.’)
 Thus far, I may have given the impression that, at least for some cases, all there is to making a 
given action of a fictional character substantively intelligible is to show that the action is related, 
mediately or immediately, to a desire for an end which falls under a desirability characterization. This is 
misleading, insofar as, in such cases, it also must be possible to see how that particular action could be 
counted as a means of achieving the end in question. In other words, the belief of the character that the 
action in question will achieve, or contribute to achieving, the relevant goal picked out by her desire, must 
be shown to be intelligible too.
 Normally, the fit between a character’s desired end and any action supposed to be motivated by it 
need not be made explicit, since it is obvious how one relates to the other. Nonetheless, that there must be 
such a fit is not a given; it is conceivable that in some work of fiction (probably, a bad one), a character 
might be described as doing one thing in order to achieve another thing, where it is unclear to the reader 
how the former could possibly be counted by the character as a means of achieving the latter (Anscombe 
1963: 35-6). For a reader to find intelligible a fictional agent’s belief B that an action A is a means of 
achieving some goal G, she must be brought to understand what features A has, such that they might be 
conceived of by the agent as contributing to or consisting in achievement of G. It does not require the 
reader to believe that an action such as A is a means of achieving G; there has to be room for the reader to 
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judge the fictional agent’s reasoning as faulty without the agent’s belief thereby collapsing into 
unintelligibility. However, if the reader does judge B to be false, so that she judges A is not actually a 
means of achieving G, then in order for B to count as intelligible, the reader has to be able to see how the 
agent might have (mistakenly) arrived at B, given the agent’s epistemic situation. For instance, in 
Madame Bovary, when Charles Bovary conceives of the operation on lame Hippolyte as a means of 
enhancing his prestige and so also Emma’s love for him, the prescient reader knows that this is 
impossible; notwithstanding, she is not required to believe that the operation will be such a means, but 
only to be able to see how Charles could think that it might be.
 This latter observation allows us to shed some further light on what I earlier called ‘weak 
intelligibility.’ For it turns out that making an action weakly intelligible is identical to positing a motive 
for an agent’s action in terms of a desire or other pro-attitude towards some eventual end, where one can 
see how the agent might reasonably believe the action is a means to that end, but cannot understand what 
might be valuable about the end in question. In other words, the fit between the action and the posited 
desire is intelligible, but the desire itself does not fall under any identifiable desirability characterization.
 So far I have been concerned with the intelligibility of desires. I now wish to turn, albeit briefly, to 
another sort of mental act with obvious relevance to the rationalization of action: moral judgment. As it is 
with a desire, a central way of making a fictional character’s moral judgment (and thereby any actions 
motivated by that judgment) substantively intelligible is to show that such a judgment falls under a 
desirability characterization which gives it a point in relation to recognizable human interests. (In such 
cases, it is also important, as before, to make it apparent how the action in question could count as a 
means of achieving the desirable end picked out by the moral judgment, a point I shall take for granted in 
what follows).
 For instance, Toni Morrison’s Beloved makes intelligible a mother’s murder of her child, who is 
otherwise facing slavery, by allowing the reader to conceive of the act as issuing from an intelligible 
moral imperative, falling under a desirability characterization – namely, “to protect every bit of life she 
had made, all the parts of her that were precious and fine and beautiful” (Morrison 1987: 163; see also 
Carroll 1998: 155). Under this description the moral judgement implicit in the heroine’s action has a 
manifest relationship to what is recognizably worthwhile in human life, and is substantively intelligible as 
such. Other moral judgments issuing in action may need their point unveiled more explicitly: in Evelyn 
Waugh’s Brideshead Revisited, for instance, Julia Flyte gives up her beloved Charles Ryder due to a 
growing awareness of the demands of her Catholic faith, and the recognition that she cannot live in sin 
with him, since she cannot bring herself to “set up a rival good to God’s” (Waugh 1962: 324). The reader 
can only grasp the point of the moral imperative behind this act of self-sacrifice once she has grasped how 
Julia’s sense of her own integrity centers on a truce with God that represents both reparation for past 
impieties and solidarity with her devout family, especially in light of the emotional impact of her formerly 
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recalcitrant father’s deathbed conversion. That this is so is made clear (thought not explicit) in the record 
of Julia’s final conversation with Charles.
  The claim I endorse here reflects something of Philippa Foot’s point that the action of “clasping 
the hands three times in an hour” could not be intelligibly thought of as a morally good action unless a 
‘special background’ were built into the thought experiment which revealed its point relative to some 
aspect of human flourishing (1967: 92). In other words, a moral concept does not attach meaningfully to 
an action or situation simply in virtue of its employer’s feeling some capricious sentiment of approval or 
disapproval towards that action or situation, which on another occasion she equally well might have 
withdrawn. Rather, its application has to be recognizably keyed to the promotion (in the case of ‘positive’ 
moral concepts) or the undermining (in the case of ‘negative’ moral concepts) of recognizable human 
interests. (Foot’s insistence that moral concepts are keyed to shared human interests is endorsed by those 
of otherwise very different views on the nature of moral claims: cognitivists like McDowell 1994: 83-4 
and noncognitivists like Blackburn 1984: 197.) This being the case, one instructive role for literature to 
play is that of showing how an apparently idiosyncratic application of a moral concept in a character’s 
judgment of a situation can nevertheless be, in that particular fictional context, substantively intelligible to 
the reader.
 Recall that to find a moral judgment intelligible in virtue of its connection to some ultimate goal 
one judges desirable is not necessarily to endorse the judgement itself. One can see why Beloved’s Sethe 
thinks it is right to kill her child, because one sees that her intended end is valuable, without necessarily 
agreeing that it is right that she killed her child. For instance, one may demur on the grounds that her 
action is not in fact a means of achieving that end, or on the grounds that other ends, whose achievement 
her action precludes, are in fact more valuable. For this reason, I reject the suggestion that, where a fiction 
makes a given moral response (substantively) intelligible, it thereby involves the reader temporarily 
‘entertaining’ in imagination that attitude or response. (For example, Matthew Kieran interprets the 
reader’s finding the protagonists of Brideshead Revisited intelligible as a matter of “entertaining the moral 
perspective of Catholicism” – Kieran 2001: 32.) To find substantively intelligible a moral judgement 
requires only that one be brought to ‘see the point’ of the judgement; to see it as related ultimately to a 
goal one judges, other things being equal, as desirable (as my discussion of the Brideshead case shows). 
This is not the same as temporarily entertaining or endorsing the judgement oneself. To find Julia Flyte 
substantively intelligible, the reader does not have to think or imagine, even temporarily (assuming that 
this is possible), that Julia is right to leave Charles, or that living with Charles would actually constitute 
“setting up a rival good to God’s.” One only has to see how she might come to think that, and to see what, 
from her perspective, might appear valuable about it as such. This, as my argument suggests, is a matter 
of recognizing the structure of her mental states and behavior, both as constituting a largely coherent 
pattern, and as having a recognizable point, relative to her epistemic position, even if one simultaneously 
rejects elements of that epistemic position as false or wrong.
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 One might object that to find Julia Flyte wholly intelligible (not just in the sense that one 
understands her action in the light of some goal judged desirable, ceteris paribus, but also in the richer 
sense, acknowledged earlier, that one understands how she could prioritize that goal over others also 
judged desirable) one must indeed be able to imaginatively adopt her evaluative perspective, if only 
temporarily. It seems to me, however, that in order to find a character’s behavior intelligible in this richer 
sense, one is required, not to imaginatively adopt her evaluative perspective, but rather to actually adopt 
her evaluative perspective, that is, to be brought to see that whatever goal is in question is more desirable 
than others the character has. This, unlike imagining, is not a temporary state. In fact, it is not clear to me 
what ‘imaginatively adopting an evaluative perspective’ amounts to, if it does not involve actually 
adopting the evaluative perspective of a fictional character. However, I do not have the space to pursue 
this matter here.
 Here then are two ways in which aspects of a character’s mental states, and hence any actions 
motivated by those states, may be made substantively intelligible to a reader. Of course, these are not the 
only ways a fictional action may be made intelligible. An action might be made substantively intelligible 
in terms of some prior emotional response, for instance. (For a detailed elaboration of what might be 
involved, see Goldie 2000.)
  The rationalizations under discussion need not be detailed explicitly. Usually, and certainly in the 
most interesting cases, the reader must infer the mediate source of a character’s motivation, and its 
perceived value, under the guidance of what is made explicit in the fiction. An implicit rationalization 
may be countered by pronouncements of the fictional agent herself; just as in life, it is possible for an 
agent to be self-deceived about her motivation while her behavior betrays it to others. After all, in order 
for a reader to be brought to understand a fictional agent’s motives, it is not required that the agent herself 
be depicted as aware of those motives.
 It is also important to reiterate that a reader may understand a character’s reasons for doing A in the 
sense in which I am interested without necessarily judging that the character has good reason to do A. I 
have deliberately focussed on examples where this is the case: for instance, one need not judge that there 
are good reasons for Humbert to kidnap Lolita or for Sethe to murder her children in order to judge such 
actions substantively (and not merely formally) intelligible. One makes such substantive judgments by 
finding the motivations of these fictional agents substantively intelligible. In such cases, either one rejects 
the attitudes of the agent which prompt the action in question, as corrupt, ill-disciplined, disproportionate, 
or otherwise inappropriate, despite their traceable relation to some goal the reader judges as good, other 
things being equal, or one rejects as false the agent’s beliefs that her actions are a reliable means to 
achieve her ultimate ends. Indeed, often the author deliberately encourages such rejection. For instance, in 
Lolita, Humbert’s attempts at justifying his treatment of Lolita are undercut by means of casual (from 
Humbert’s perspective) yet revealing (from the reader’s perspective) remarks he makes about her: her 
manifest boredom, her bouts of weeping, and so on. Of course, a work of fiction can lead the reader to see 
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the motivating reasons of a character as good ones. Yet it is one of the great functions of fiction, and 
especially of the novel, to reveal how a character’s perspective on the world may come apart from what 
(fictionally) is the case; that is, to demonstrate that what the fictional agent ultimately holds valuable, 
though perhaps valuable ceteris paribus, should not be pursued in the particular context in which it is 
being considered.
 
Fictional Reasons and “Real Life” Understanding
One might wonder what any of this has to do with understanding of real life cases. After all, one might 
protest, fictions are about fictional entities, not real ones. How can a work about fictional characters and 
events have implications for how we might interpret real people?
 Behind this worry lies the picture alluded to above in my introduction: that psychological 
understanding is acquired inductively. However, this is the wrong way to look at things, at least with 
respect to the substantive intelligibility of the sort of cases under discussion.
 I have argued that a fiction may make a character’s action substantively intelligible by (1) 
establishing a connection between the action in question and a desire/ moral judgment of the character’s 
which falls, immediately or mediately, under a desirability characterization; and (2) further establishing 
the reasonableness of the character’s belief that the action in question counts as contributing to the goal 
invoked in the desirability characterization cited in (1).
 The successful execution of (1) forces the reader to acknowledge that the action n question is 
motivated in the light of some worthwhile or desirable goal, ceteris paribus. Now, one could not 
acknowledge that some goal G was a worthwhile one for humans to pursue, other things being equal, yet 
at the same time maintain that no human being ever could be motivated to pursue G. In other words, in 
acknowledging that a goal is a worthwhile one for humans to pursue, ceteris paribus, one just is 
acknowledging that some actual human being might be motivated to pursue it.
 Meanwhile, the successful execution of (2) tells us that the character could believe (though perhaps 
falsely) that the action in question counts as contributing to the goal invoked in (1). Now, where p is any 
proposition, if it is reasonable for a fictional character in a given context to believe that p, then it would be 
reasonable for anyone in the same context, relevantly specified, to believe that p, whether that person is 
real or fictional. Another way of putting this is that whether the person concerned is real or fictional is 
not, on its own, relevant to what counts as reasonable for such a person to believe in a given context. 
What is relevant is the rest of the person’s mental states at the time (or, in the fictional case, what other 
mental states the person is fictionally depicted as having): her beliefs, desires, intentions, hopes, fears, and 
so on. This reflects a point familiar from the work of Donald Davidson: one’s judgment that it is 
reasonable for a given agent to have a belief depends on one’s also being able to attribute to her a whole 
network of other intentional states consistent with that belief (1980b: 221). To be capable of thinking of 
another as having propositional attitudes at all presupposes that her intentional mental states largely 
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cohere (Davidson 1985: 245). If this is right, and if we assume that thinking of fictional characters 
involves thinking of them as having propositional attitudes (as it does when thinking of real people), then 
our ability to think of them as having propositional attitudes depends on our interpretations of them being 
governed by the same standards which govern our interpretations of rational agents in general. These 
standards apply to real and hypothetical or fictional agents alike.
 So successful execution of (2) tells us, in effect, that some actual (rational) human being could 
believe the action in question counts as contributing to the goal invoked in (1). Thus, the successful 
execution of (1) and (2) together, insofar as it amounts to showing the substantive intelligibility of a given 
action in terms of certain motivation(s), provides a demonstration that it is possible for someone (a real 
person, not just a fictional character) to be motivated to act in just this way. This, I suggest, brings us 
genuine psychological understanding of a potentially new and important kind.
 An instructive contrast may be made with what I earlier called ‘weak intelligibility.’ Recall the 
example of a character desiring a saucer of mud, with which to rub mud in her face in order to make her 
face the same color as the wardrobe. Assuming this is weakly but not substantively intelligible as a 
motivation (insofar as it does not readily fall under any desirability characterization), simply seeing that 
these mental states cohere, in that one action obviously counts as a means to the next, does not thereby 
bring with it any knowledge about the possibility of their combination within some real human being. 
Until we can see why someone might want to make her face the same color as a wardrobe, and not just 
‘why’ in the sense of some further, equally incomprehensible reason being posited (e.g. that ‘she wanted 
to look like a tree’), but ‘why’ in the sense of it being shown why this might count as a desirable thing to 
do, we are none the wiser as to whether some real person might actually be motivated in this way. In 
contrast, a judgment that a given fictional action is substantively intelligible by virtue of its connection to 
some desire or moral judgment that is intelligibly linked to some further desirable end, brings with it the 
knowledge that this is a possible way for real human beings to be motivated. To read about Beloved’s 
Sethe or Lolita’s Humbert and to understand each of them is to know that some real human being could 
be motivated to act as each, fictionally, acts.
 This knowledge is not acquired by induction – that is, we do not need to find at least one other 
instance of someone who is motivated as Humbert is ‘in the great world’ before we can assent to the 
possibility of this combination of desire and action. The knowledge is acquired just by our finding the 
action in question substantively intelligible. The substantive intelligibility of a given action does not at all 
count as partial evidence that some agent could act in that way; rather, it establishes this conclusively. 
Hence it is not true that “art never confirms its truths” (Stolnitz 1992: 196). We have found confirmation 
of the observation, made against Carroll, that “our beliefs about moral psychology can be refined and 
changed in abstraction from knowledge of brute empirical facts” (Conolly and Haydar 2001: 121). Fiction 
is then potentially a ‘self-sufficient’ source of psychological understanding; and so there is no reason to 
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deny either that such understanding can be substantially new to the reader or that it can be genuinely 
interesting and complex.
 Earlier I admitted that it is possible for a reader to be brought to see a given goal as desirable 
ceteris paribus whilst continuing to find unintelligible a character’s prioritization of that goal over other 
goals, and her indifference to the (from the reader’s perspective) undesirability of the goal’s 
consequences. Does this threaten my claim that fiction can provide conclusive knowledge of 
psychological possibilities? I don’t think so. Even in those cases where a goal is shown to be desirable yet 
unintelligible, insofar as it is prioritized by a character over other apparently more valuable goals, 
something can be learnt, namely, that the goal can be intelligibly pursued at all. This is so even though it 
may still be unclear how the goal can be intelligibly pursued in the precise context in which the character 
pursues it.
 It is a consequence of my view that certain works of fiction are on a par with diaries or 
autobiographies with respect to what they can reveal to the reader about possible motives for action. 
Obviously, diaries and fictional works differ in that only the former can provide information about the 
motives upon which agents have acted. Here I suppose one might insist that information about possible 
motives for acting is uninteresting, unless it is also information about some historical agent’s actual 
motives, as is found in diaries. Stolnitz intimates as much when he criticizes fiction for not being able to 
show that a given reason, explored in a fiction, could be ‘the primary’ or ‘inevitable’ cause of a real action 
(1992: 195). However, it is not clear why we should accept this bias towards the actual. Whether a given 
rationalization is of a fictional action or one that has actually occurred seems irrelevant to whether we 
find it illuminating or not. Accounts of the purported motives of real agents can be profoundly 
unilluminating: consider the prima facie unintelligibility of a wife-beater’s account of his activities, who 
claims that he acts thus ‘because he loves her.’ Meanwhile, although the discovery that The Diary of Anne 
Frank is a fiction (as is sometimes suggested) might lessen the power of the book in certain ways, it 
seems obvious that the force of the lessons one has learned, from that work about what was possible for a 
adolescent growing up in Holland under the Nazis – how she might think, feel, desire, and act in such a 
situation – would not be undermined.
 Alternatively, one might accept that fiction can provide us with psychological insights in the form 
of knowledge of possible motives for action, yet question the value of these insights on the following 
grounds. One could agree it is possible that someone might be motivated to kill a child in the light of such 
motives as Sethe has; nevertheless, given the specificity of Sethe’s epistemic situation (including 
references to the background slavery, her specific perception of what she has suffered in the past, her 
beliefs about the supernatural, and so on), it is highly unlikely that any person would be, in actuality, so 
motivated. This is reminiscent of one horn of a dilemma intimated by Stolnitz: either the psychological 
portraits offered by fictions are so detailed in their specifications of fictional characters and events that 
12
they cannot be applied to the ‘real world;’ or they are shorn of such elements, in which case we are left 
only with truisms (1992: 193-4). 
 We can reject the first horn of this dilemma, however. I have insisted that often part of what it is to 
explain an otherwise unintelligible fictional action is to redescribe it so as to give it a place in relation to a 
pattern of attitudes and beliefs which thereby reveal it as related to the pursuit of a goal which the reader 
judges, all things being equal, as desirable. For this to be possible, the action and the attitudes which 
motivate that action, no matter how specifically described, must also be describable in more general 
terms. Whether a given fictional action is judged to have a recognizable point will depend, not on features 
of the situation described at the most specific or particular level, but on whether that action possesses 
more general, abstract features repeatable elsewhere. For instance, a reader of Beloved can understand 
Sethe's murder of her child only if that reader sees the murder as motivated by a desire to save, not just 
those children full stop, but those children because they are to Sethe what is “precious and fine and 
beautiful” (Morrison 1987: 163). These are characteristics which might (though not, perhaps, for Sethe) 
be true of other people in other circumstances.
 Additionally, as we have seen, an action is made intelligible by showing how the agent's belief that 
the action will fulfill some goal of hers is itself intelligible; that is, by showing what features of the action 
might be seen by the agent as contributing to, or consisting in achievement of, the goal in question. For 
this, too, the action must be describable in terms of relatively general features relevant not only to this 
situation in particular, but elsewhere.
 No psychological information conveyed by a work of fiction is so indelibly tied to the context of 
the fiction that it cannot be made potentially relevant to real human beings. Therefore, worries of the sort 
voiced by Stolnitz are unfounded.
  Finally, one might object that any knowledge acquired in this way from fictions is not 
propositional knowledge, strictly speaking, and so does not falsify the claims of those who argue that 
fiction cannot give us psychological insight of a propositional sort. I am not sure what this objection 
might rest on, other than a prejudice that the proper objects of propositional knowledge are confined to 
only those propositions which can be easily or briefly conveyed or assimilated. Here, I do not think we 
should overstate the requirements on what counts as propositional knowledge. A piece of propositional 
knowledge can take the form of a collection of many propositions, including propositions of extremely 
complex form and/or content. This being so, there seems to be no impediment to analyzing, as 
propositional in form, psychological information about the connections between a given act and the 
possible motivations behind it – information that one can clearly acquire from reading fiction. Granted, 
the kind of psychological understanding of the possibilities of human mental life one gains through 
reading fiction is not aphoristic in form, and can take much time and effort to extract from a given fiction, 
but this does not entail that it is not propositional. It means only that its characterization can be very 
complicated. That is, I suggest, as we would wish.
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